Internship Before Formal Enrollment Do Not Satisfy Professional Experience Requirement: Delhi HC Declines Plea Of Lawyer To Be Empanelled With Legal Services Authority

The Delhi High Court has held that internships undertaken as part of legal education, though valuable in providing practical exposure, do not satisfy the professional experience requirement for practicing law, as legal practice is officially recognized as commencing only after formal enrollment as an Advocate with the relevant Bar Council.

The Court was dealing with a writ petition filed by an Advocate seeking directions against the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee for inclusion of his name in the list of shortlisted candidates for the interview for empanelment of the “Jail Visiting Panel”.

A single bench of Justice Sanjeev Narula held, "The legal practice is officially recognized as commencing only after formal enrolment as an Advocate with the relevant Bar Council. Internships undertaken as part of legal education, though valuable in providing practical exposure, do not satisfy the professional experience requirement for practicing law. The period of “internship” as a student does not amount to the active legal practice contemplated under the eligibility criteria, and as such, cannot be counted towards the three-year experience required for empanelment. The term “apprenticeship” in the DHCLSC notice clearly refers to the period after formal enrolment when an advocate might work under the guidance of a senior practitioner."

The petitioner, Advocate Ujwal Ghai appeared in person while the respondent was represented by Advocate Harsh Prabhakar.

The petitioner, who is a practicing Advocate, applied for empanelment in the Jail Visiting Panel responding to a Notice issued by the DHCLSC. However, his name was not included in the shortlist of candidates. Upon inquiry, he learned that his application might have been rejected due to not meeting the minimum experience requirement of three years of legal practice as of the cut-off date. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present writ petition. 

He fervently argued that the decision of the DHCLSC was arbitrary and inconsistent with the prescribed norms as he duly fulfilled all requirements as per the notification, and therefore his exclusion defies reason and the principles of fairness. The crux of his contention rested on the interpretation of Regulation 8(3) of the National Legal Services Authority (Free and Competent Legal Services) Regulations, 2010 as he asserted that the term “ordinarily,” does not impose a rigid, inflexible mandate but rather allows for discretion. In his view, the language of the clause implied that exceptions can, and should be made under appropriate circumstances, based on which he argued that the regulation allows empanelment of candidates having experience of less than 3 years. 

The Court, however, found his submissions 'unconvincing' and noted that while it is true that Regulation 8(3) uses the term “ordinarily,” this word must be given a meaningful interpretation.

"The regulation permits exceptions, allowing for the empanelment of legal practitioners with less than three years of experience, but this is intended to be an exercise of discretion rather than a mandatory rule. The presence of the term “ordinarily” does not imply that the three year experience requirement can be disregarded. Rather, it sets a general standard, with deviations permitted only in exceptional cases where the DHCLSC deems it appropriate," the Court held.

It was of the view that accepting the petitioner's interpretation would effectively rewrite the regulation, transforming a discretionary exception into a blanket rule that nullifies the prerequisite of having three years of experience and the court cannot endorse an interpretation that undermines the regulation's intended framework.

With respect to his contention that the notice issued by the DHCLSC uses the word “apprenticeship,” and therefore, his internship experience should be factored into the calculation of the three year experience requirement, the court observed, "Mr. Ghai’s contention equates the terms “internship” and “apprenticeship,” suggesting that the internship experience gained before being formally enrolled as an Advocate should be treated as equivalent to an apprenticeship under legal terminology. However, this interpretation overlooks a critical distinction. The legal practice is officially recognized as commencing only after formal enrolment as an Advocate with the relevant Bar Council. Internships undertaken as part of legal education, though valuable in providing practical exposure, do not satisfy the professional experience requirement for practicing law. The period of “internship” as a student does not amount to the active legal practice contemplated under the eligibility criteria, and as such, cannot be counted towards the three-year experience required for empanelment. The term “apprenticeship” in the DHCLSC notice clearly refers to the period after formal enrolment when an advocate might work under the guidance of a senior practitioner."

The Court further cited example of certain government bodies engaging the services of law graduates as apprentices in their legal departments for a stipulated time and under the Apprentices Act, 1961 and clarified that these opportunities are available for people who have graduated with an LLB degree.

"Therefore, to equate a law student’s internship with post-enrolment practice would blur the distinction between academic training and professional legal experience, thereby undermining the clear intent of the eligibility requirement. Hence, the Petitioner’s practice must be calculated from the date of his enrolment with the Bar Council, not from any internship period during his legal studies," the Court observed.

 Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.

Cause Title: Ujwal Ghai vs Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee

Appearances:

Petitioner: In-Person

Respondent: Advocates Harsh Prabhakar, Dhruv Chaudhry, Eshita Pallavi and Adeeb Ahmad.

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