Interpretation Of Rule 3A(3) Of Order XLI CPC Is Permissive Rather Than Mandatory: Bombay HC In Plea Seeking Stay On Implementation & Execution Of MACT Award
The Bombay High Court held that the interpretation of Rule 3-A(3) of Order XLI of the CPC should be permissive rather than mandatory. This ruling affirmed that the court has the discretion to grant interim stays in appeals filed after the time limit, even while applications for condonation of delay are pending. The applicants were seeking a stay of the implementation and execution of awards issued by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals. An issue arose regarding the interpretation of Rule 3-A(3) of Order XLI of the CPC, questioning whether it was mandatory or permissive.
A Bench of Justice Abhay Ahuja held, “Ergo, considering the authoritative pronouncement of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhagwan Ganpatrao Godsay Vs. Kachrulal Bastimal Samdariya and connected matters (supra) that the word “shall” used in sub-rule (3), of Rule 3-A in Order XLI of the CPC be construed as permissive and not mandatory in the absence of any decision to the contrary, I am bound by the same.”
Advocate Yuvraj P Narvankar appeared for the Applicants and Advocate Pandey appeared upon the invitation of the Court.
One side argued that the rule is mandatory, meaning the court cannot grant a stay in such cases, while the other side contended that the court should have discretion to grant interim relief, such as a stay, pending the decision on the delay condonation application.
The Court noted that earlier High Court had interpreted Rule 3-A(3) as permissive, allowing the court to grant interim stays in cases where appeals are filed after the time limit, even while applications for condonation of delay are pending. This interpretation was based on the idea that a strict, mandatory interpretation could render the appeal infructuous, defeating the purpose of the rule. The court's decision to interpret "shall" in Rule 3-A(3) as permissive aligned with the objective of expediting the disposal of delay condonation applications and ensuring they serve the remedy of appeal.
The Court believed that a strict interpretation could hinder justice and procedural fairness.
The Court also referred to relevant legal precedents and highlighted that the use of "shall" or "may" depends on the context and legislative intent. In this case, the Court found that a permissive interpretation of "shall" in Rule 3-A(3) is consistent with the legislative intent to regulate appeals and prevent their admission without considering delay condonation.
The Court further said that while there is a Supreme Court precedent regarding Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 3-A of Order XLI, no contrary Supreme Court decision exists concerning the interpretation of the word "shall" in Sub-Rule (3) of the same rule, as per the Division Bench decision in the mentioned case.
The Court concluded that it has the discretion to grant interim stays in time-barred appeals pending the decision on the delay condonation application. The Court thus held that, “the applications for stay of the impugned judgment and award passed under the MV Act in a proposed First Appeal can be considered for ad-interim/interim stay even if the condonation of delay application is pending.”
The Court finally considered individual applications for interim stays of judgment and award in specific cases, with the condition of depositing the decretal amount. All these applications are scheduled for further proceedings on October 19, 2023, along with related interim applications.
Case Title: Shriram General Insurance Company Limited & Ors. v. Jyoti Vithoba Nahire & Anr., [2023:BHC-AS:27956]
Click here to read/download the Order