Even In Absence Of Regulations Being Framed U/S.105H MMC Act, Proceedings for Eviction Can Be Continued By Inquiry Officer: SC
The Supreme Court clarified that even in the absence of regulations being framed under section 105H of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, the proceedings for eviction can be continued by the Inquiry Officer by adhering to principles of natural justice.
The Apex Court also added that the said provision cannot be construed as placing an embargo on the Inquiry Officer to proceed until regulations were framed.
The Appellants approached the Supreme Court after being aggrieved by the common judgment passed on a batch of writ petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. The appellants had issues with the Judge having framed points for determination by the Inquiry Officer under the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra said, “Much of the utility in ensuring that public premises are made free of unauthorised occupants would be lost on such technical pleas based raised and examined on a provision of law which is not imperative in terms. All that is required, as held above, is adherence to natural justice principles wherever applicable.”
Advocate Ashish Wad represented the Appellants while Senior Advocate Rajendra Pai represented the Respondents.
The respondents are occupants and/or legal heirs of the original occupants who were allotted the subject premises on leave and license basis in the 1960s, owing to their employment with the appellants. In 2007, eviction proceedings were initiated against the respondents under the provisions of the Act. The respondents approached the High Court seeking to convert their tenancy to permanent ownership on the basis of a resolution which had allegedly been passed by the Municipal Commissioner.The High Court firmly struck down such a challenge. Thereafter, the Supreme Court dismissed the challenge to the order of the High Court refusing to nullify the eviction proceedings, thus, stamping its approval on initiation and continuation of such proceedings.
Notices were issued to the respondents directing them to vacate the premises which triggered the second round of litigation by the respondents. The Inquiry Officer ruled against the respondents.Still aggrieved, the respondents, in yet another challenge, invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 and assailed the eviction proceedings. The High Court framed 9 points for determination with respect to the pending inquiry proceedings.
The appellants assailed the impugned order on the ground that Chapter V-A of the Act being a complete code in itself, the High Court effectively granted a premium to the dilatory tactics being adopted by the respondents who are none else but unauthorised occupants of public premises. On the contrary, the respondents voiced in chorus that the approach of the High Court is one that sub-serves justice with a view to secure the precious right to life of the respondents by narrowing down the controversy so that the proceedings could be taken to its logical conclusion as early as possible.0
One of the issues before the Bench was whether the order passed by the Principal Judge as a persona designata, was amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 or whether the same was passed in the capacity of a judicial authority for the same to be amenable to Article 227 jurisdiction. Relying upon its judgment in LIC v. Nandini J. Shah (2018) 15 SCC 356, the Bench said, “In view of such binding decision, the inescapable conclusion presenting itself is that the appellate order under challenge before the High Court was rendered by a civil court, and it is trite that orders passed by a civil court cannot be challenged in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
It was observed that the writ petition of the respondents seeking quashing of the decision of a civil court by issuing a writ of certiorari was not maintainable and ought to have been dismissed at the threshold with respect to its primary relief.
Referring to its judgment in n Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim (1983) 4 SCC 566 wherein it has been held that a mere wrong decision is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227, the Bench held that the petition of the respondents also failed to merit the exercise of the High Court’s supervisory powers and should have been rejected in view of the same.
It was also reiterated that decisions rendered by administrative authorities can be interfered with by high courts in exercise of Article 226 powers, however, sparingly. Once the appellate order of the Appellate Officer came into existence, the order of the Inquiry Officer merged in the former. It had no independent existence.
The Bench asserted, “...it is held that the High Court in the present case exceeded the ambit of both, its writ and supervisory, jurisdiction insofar as it proceeded to frame points for determination in a summary proceeding, more so when the proceedings were at the embryonic stage of notice having been issued to the respondents. Having directed that the proceedings be conducted in consonance with the principles of natural justice, the High Court overstepped its limits and took unto itself a duty which the Act entrusts the statutory authority to exercise. The High Court could, at best, have moulded relief as deemed fit and proper, but in framing issues for the Inquiry Officer to determine, the High Court went far beyond its domain by substituting its own wisdom for that of the civil court.”
The Bench also held, “ We hold that even in the absence of regulations being framed under section 105H of the Act, the proceedings for eviction can be continued by the Inquiry Officer by adhering to principles of natural justice. The said provision cannot be construed as placing an embargo on the Inquiry Officer to proceed until regulations were framed.”
As per the Bench, the impugned order entertaining writ petitions which were not maintainable in the form they were presented did not warrant the High Court to exercise jurisdiction by framing points for determination by the Inquiry Officer. Thus, allowing the civil appeals, the Bench directed the Inquiry Officer to allow both parties to lead evidence and raise whatever points are available in defence, except to the extent determined by judicial orders previously.
Cause Title: Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Others v. Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc. [Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 985]
Appearance:
Appellants: Advocates Ashish Wad, Manoj Wad, Akriti Arya, Swati Arya, AOR M/S. J.S. Wad And Co.
Respondents: Senior Advocate Rajendra Pai,Advocates Aloukik Pai, Akshay Pai, AOR Anand Dilip Landge, Advocates Sangeeta S Pahune Patil, Sumit Kumar