Orders Passed By Civil Court Could Be Challenged Under Article 227 Of Constitution And Not Under Article 226: Supreme Court

Update: 2024-12-16 10:45 GMT

The Supreme Court reiterated that an order of the civil court could only be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution, and not Article 226 thereof.

The appellants approached the Apex Court challenging the judgment passed on a batch of writ petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by the  Bombay High Court. The impugned Order directed expeditious disposal of proceedings for eviction pending before the Inquiry Officer against the respondents. It was the case of the appellants that the Judge took upon himself the burden of framing points for determination and had, in effect, laid down a procedure which was contrary to the provisions of Chapter V-A.

The Bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra held, “A perusal thereof reveals a reasoned order, supported by judicial decisions, answering distinctly each and every contention raised by the noticees. What seems to be apparent is the absence of any of the telling circumstances, as laid down in the decisions above, which could have warranted interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226; thus, on this count too, the respondents’ writ petition was liable to be dismissed.”

Advocate Ashish Wad represented the Appellants while Senior Advocate Rajendra Pai represented the Respondents.

The respondents are occupants and/or legal heirs of the original occupants who were allotted the subject premises on leave and license basis in the 1960s, owing to their employment with the appellants. In 2007, the eviction proceedings were initiated against the respondents under the provisions of the Act. The respondents approached the High Court seeking to convert their tenancy to permanent ownership on the basis of a resolution which had allegedly been passed by the Municipal Commissioner. The High Court firmly struck down such a challenge. Thereafter, the Supreme Court dismissed the challenge to the order of the High Court refusing to nullify the eviction proceedings, thus, stamping its approval on initiation and continuation of such proceedings.

Notices were issued to the respondents directing them to vacate the premises which triggered the second round of litigation by the respondents. The Inquiry Officer ruled against the respondents. Still aggrieved, the respondents, in yet another challenge, invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 and assailed the eviction proceedings. The High Court framed 9 points for determination with respect to the pending inquiry proceedings.

The Bench started with an examination of the constitutional provisions invoked by the respondents before the High Court i.e. under Articles 226 and 227. Challenge was laid in the writ petitions to an order passed by the Principal Judge in appeals under section 105F of the Act. Such order held the respondents’ appeals to be not maintainable. In their writ petition, the respondents sought a writ of certiorari to quash the orders passed by the Principal Civil Judge and that of the Inquiry Officer.

One of the main issues before the Bench was whether the order was passed by the Principal Judge as a persona designata, so as to be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 or whether the same was passed in the capacity of a judicial authority for the same to be amenable to Article 227 jurisdiction. Relying upon its judgment in LIC v. Nandini J. Shah (2018), the Bench said, “In view of such binding decision, the inescapable conclusion presenting itself is that the appellate order under challenge before the High Court was rendered by a civil court, and it is trite that orders passed by a civil court cannot be challenged in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. This point in law has been decisively reiterated in the 3-Judge Bench decision in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath. This Court, while holding that an order of the civil court could only be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution, and not Article 226 thereof”

Referring to its judgment in Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim (1983) 4 SCC 566 wherein it has been held that a mere wrong decision is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227, the Bench held that the petition of the respondents failed to merit the exercise of the High Court’s supervisory powers and should have been rejected in view of the same.

On the second relief claimed in the writ petition of the respondents, i.e., the challenge laid to the order passed by the Inquiry Officer, the Bench said,“It is well settled that decisions rendered by administrative authorities can be interfered with by high courts in exercise of Article 226.”

It was also noticed that once the appellate order of the Appellate Officer came into existence, the order of the Inquiry Officer merged in the former.

The Bench was of the view that the High Court in the present case exceeded the ambit of both, its writ and supervisory jurisdiction insofar as it proceeded to frame points for determination in a summary proceeding, especially when the proceedings were at the embryonic stage of notice having been issued to the respondents.

“Having directed that the proceedings be conducted in consonance with the principles of natural justice, the High Court overstepped its limits and took unto itself a duty which the Act entrusts the statutory authority to exercise. The High Court could, at best, have moulded relief as deemed fit and proper, but in framing issues for the Inquiry Officer to determine, the High Court went far beyond its domain by substituting its own wisdom for that of the civil court”, the Bench concluded.

According to the High Court, the impugned order entertaining writ petitions which were not maintainable in the form they were presented did not warrant the High Court to exercise jurisdiction by framing points for determination by the Inquiry Officer. Setting aside the impugned Order, the Bench allowed the civil appeals and directed the Inquiry Officer to allow both parties to lead evidence and raise whatever points are available in defence, except to the extent determined by judicial orders previously.

Cause Title: Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Others v. Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc. [Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 985]

Appearance:

Appellants: Advocates Ashish Wad, Manoj Wad, Akriti Arya, Swati Arya, AOR M/S. J.S. Wad And Co.

Respondents: Senior Advocate Rajendra Pai,Advocates Aloukik Pai, Akshay Pai, AOR Anand Dilip Landge, Advocates Sangeeta S Pahune Patil, Sumit Kumar

Click here toread/download Judgment



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