Minor Nature Of Injuries Is Not Sufficient Reason To Not Frame A Charge U/S 307 IPC For Attempt To Murder: Supreme Court

The Court set aside the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court which acquitted the accused holding that there was no basis for an offence under Section 307 of the IPC since the injury caused by the accused or the act done by them was not likely to result in the death of the victim. The Court accordingly directed the trial court to have the accused stand trial for all the offences for which charges have been framed, including under Section 307 of the IPC.

A Bench of Justice C.T. Ravikumar and Justice Sanjay Karol observed, “In view of the above discussion, given that the minor nature of injuries is not sufficient reason to not frame a charge under Section 307 IPC, as per the law laid down by this Court, the judgment impugned…is set aside…The concerned Trial Court is directed to have the Respondents stand trial for all the offences for which charges have been framed, as also Section 307.”

AOR Nishesh Sharma represented the appellant, while AOR Sunny Choudhary appeared for the respondent.

The prosecution alleged that the victim, who was serving as the Chairman of the Waqf Board, was allegedly abused and beaten to the point of unconsciousness following a dispute with members of a previous Masjid Committee. An FIR was lodged under Sections 294, 323, and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The prosecution submitted the medical officer’s report which suggested that the throttling could have resulted in respiratory arrest. However, charges under Section 307 of the IPC were excluded by the trial court.

The Supreme Court referred to its decision in Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand (2004), wherein it was held that it’s not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted for applicability of Section 307 of the IPC…“Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds.”

The Bench reiterated that intention may not always be proved by hard evidence and instead may be required to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. “If the doctor who conducted the examination posits the possibility of throttling, then under what circumstances, without rigorous cross-examination, could it be concluded that the injuries sustained were simple?” the Court remarked.

The Court stated that even if the injuries were taken as simple, the extent of the injuries, as observed in Hari Mohan Mondal (supra), were not relevant if the intent was present. “We are not in agreement with the learned Courts below that intent was absent, as the Doctor’s report itself records throttling to be reasonably suspected,” the Bench held.

The Bench further clarified that the question of intention to kill or the knowledge of death in terms of Section 307 of the IPC was a question of fact and not one of law.

Consequently, the Court directed, “The trial shall proceed on its own merits, as per law, uninfluenced by the observations hereinabove which were for the limited purpose of testing the propriety of the impugned order. The same shall be expedited.”

Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal.

Cause Title: Shoyeb Raja v. State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 731)

Appearance:

Appellant: AOR Nishesh Sharma; Advocate Shiva Nand Mishra

Respondent: AOR Sunny Choudhary and Sharad Chauhan; Advocate Vivek Mishra, Yagyawalkya Singh and Sharmishtha Shukla

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