Supreme Court
Inability Of State’s Police Machinery To Tackle Law & Order Situation Not An Excuse To Invoke Power Of Preventive Detention: SC
Supreme Court

Inability Of State’s Police Machinery To Tackle Law & Order Situation Not An Excuse To Invoke Power Of Preventive Detention: SC

Verdictum News Desk
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22 March 2024 12:00 PM GMT

The Supreme Court observed that the inability on the part of the State’s police machinery to tackle the law and order situation should not be an excuse to invoke the jurisdiction of preventive detention.

Holding that the Advisory Board must consider whether the detention is necessary not just in the eyes of the detaining authority but also in the eyes of law, the Bench of Chief Justice DY Chandrachud, Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra observed that, "preventive detention being a draconian measure, any order of detention as a result of a capricious or routine exercise of powers must be nipped in the bud. It must be struck down at the first available threshold and as such, it should be the Advisory Board that must take into consideration all aspects not just the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authorities but whether such satisfaction justifies detention of the detenu. The Advisory Board must consider whether the detention is necessary not just in the eyes of the detaining authority but also in the eyes of law."

The Court summarized the law on preventive detentions as follows:

(i) The Detaining Authority should take into consideration only relevant and vital material to arrive at the requisite subjective satisfaction,

(ii) It is an unwritten law, constitutional and administrative, that wherever a decision-making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of the statutory functionary, there is an implicit duty to apply his mind to the pertinent and proximate matters and eschew those which are irrelevant & remote,

(iii) There can be no dispute about the settled proposition that the detention order requires subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which, ordinarily, cannot be questioned by the court for insufficiency of material. Nonetheless, if the detaining authority does not consider relevant circumstances or considers wholly unnecessary, immaterial and irrelevant circumstances, then such subjective satisfaction would be vitiated,

(iv) In quashing the order of detention, the Court does not sit in judgment over the correctness of the subjective satisfaction. The anxiety of the Court should be to ascertain as to whether the decision-making process for reaching the subjective satisfaction is based on objective facts or influenced by any caprice, malice or irrelevant considerations or non-application of mind, (v) While making a detention order, the authority should arrive at a proper satisfaction which should be reflected clearly, and in categorical terms, in the order of detention,

(vi) The satisfaction cannot be inferred by mere statement in the order that “it was necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order”. Rather the detaining authority will have to justify the detention order from the material that existed before him and the process of considering the said material should be reflected in the order of detention while expressing its satisfaction,

(vii) Inability on the part of the state’s police machinery to tackle the law and order situation should not be an excuse to invoke the jurisdiction of preventive detention,

(viii) Justification for such an order should exist in the ground(s) furnished to the detenu to reinforce the order of detention. It cannot be explained by reason(s) / grounds(s) not furnished to the detenu. The decision of the authority must be the natural culmination of the application of mind to the relevant and material facts available on the record, and

(ix) To arrive at a proper satisfaction warranting an order of preventive detention, the detaining authority must, first examine the material adduced against the prospective detenu to satisfy itself whether his conduct or antecedent(s) reflect that he has been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and, second, if the aforesaid satisfaction is arrived at, it must further consider whether it is likely that the said person would act in a manner prejudicial to the public order in near future unless he is prevented from doing so by passing an order of detention . For passing a detention order based on subjective satisfaction, the answer of the aforesaid aspects and points must be against the prospective detenu. The absence of application of mind to the pertinent and proximate material and vital matters would show lack of statutory satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority.

Counsel P Mohit Rao appeared for the appellant, while Counsel Kumar Vaibhav appeared for the respondent.

In September 2023, an order of detention was issued by respondent No. 2, under Subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1986, against Nenavath Ravi. The order cited Ravi as a "Goonda" under clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. It alleged that Ravi habitually engaged in unlawful activities, including robberies, property theft offenses, and gold chain snatchings in broad daylight.

The detention order detailed Ravi's criminal history, citing four offenses committed in quick succession during 2023. Among these, two offenses were within the Commissionerate limits, forming the basis for his detention. It further accused Ravi of committing offenses continuously to fund a lavish lifestyle, disturbing public peace, and tranquility.

The grounds for detention, provided to Ravi along with the order, reiterated his status as a "Goonda" and outlined specific incidents, such as a robbery case where he and his associates robbed a woman and fled the scene. Another incident involved snatching a gold nuptial chain from an elderly woman.

Ravi challenged the detention order however, the High Court rejected the petition, affirming the detention order's validity.

During the appeal, Ravi's counsel argued that the mere registration of FIRs under Chapter XVII of the IPC is insufficient to label an individual as a "Goonda." They contended that Ravi's actions did not amount to acts prejudicial to public order and criticized the High Court's reliance on allegations of chain snatching to justify detention.

The Apex Court observed that, "mere registration of the two FIRs for the alleged offences of robbery etc. could not have been made the basis to invoke the provisions of the Act 1986 for the purpose of preventively detaining the appellant herein on the assumption that he is a “GOONDA” as defined under Section 2(g) of the Act 1986... in order to bring the activities of a person within the expression of “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” the activities must be of such a nature that the ordinary laws cannot deal with them or prevent subversive activities affecting society. Inability on the part of the state’s police machinery to tackle the law and order situation should not be an excuse to invoke the jurisdiction of preventive detention."

It was further noted that the Detaining Authority was not correct, and had considered something extraneous. It was said that, "it, prima facie, appears that the detenu might have been picked up by the police on suspicion and then all that has been relied upon to point a finger towards the detenu is his confessional statement before the police."

To that end, it was said that the Advisory Board is not a mere rubber-stamping authority for an order of preventive detention. In that context, it was said that, "Whenever any order of detention is placed before it for review, it must play an active role in ascertaining whether the detention is justified under the law or not. Where it finds that such order of detention is against the spirit of the Act or in contravention of the law as laid down by the courts, it can definitely opine that the order of detention is not sustainable and should not shy away from expressing the same in its report."

Subsequently, the impugned judgment and order of detention were set aside.

Appearances:

Appellant: Counsel P Mohith Rao

Respondent: Counsel Kumar Vaibhav

Cause Title: Nenavath Bujji Etc. vs The State of Telangana & Ors.

Click here to read/download the Judgment


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