"Test Of Vice Of Discrimination In Taxing Law Is Less Rigorous": Supreme Court Upholds Constitutional Validity Of Section 17(5) (c) & (d) CGST Act
|The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of clauses (c) and (d) of Section (5) of Section 17(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act), while holding that the test of vice of discrimination in a taxing statute is less rigorous.
The Court stated that the alleged violation of Articles 19(1)(g) and 300A of the Constitution was not elaborated by the assessees.
A Bench of Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice Sanjay Karol observed, “As we are upholding the constitutional validity of clauses (c) and (d) of Section 17(5), and as held earlier, its plain interpretation does not lead to any ambiguity, the question of reading down the provisions does not arise.”
ASG N. Venkatraman and Senior Advocates Arijit Prasad, Sujit Ghosh and Arvind P Datar appeared for the parties.
The appeal challenged the constitutional validity of clauses (c) and (d) of Section 17(5) of the CGST Act, which restricted the Input Tax Credit (ITC) for goods and services used in the construction of immovable properties.
The assessees contended that the bar on claiming ITC for inputs used in constructing immovable properties was arbitrary and irrational. They argued that this results in treating unequally placed businesses on the same footing, thus violating Article 14. Further, they asserted that the denial of ITC in such cases leads to the cascading effect of tax, which goes against the principle of GST that allows credit for tax paid at earlier stages of production and distribution.
It was further argued that even assuming that coming into existence of an immovable property was an intelligible differentia, it had no nexus with the objects of the CGST Act. The reason was that denying credit in such cases perpetuates and continues the cascading effect of tax, contrary to the very object of the CGST Act of eliminating the cascading effect of tax and achieving tax neutrality.
The Supreme Court noted that the challenge to constitutional validity did not meet the test of reasonable classification, which was a part of Article 14 of the Constitution. “To satisfy the test, there must be an intelligible differentia forming the basis of the classification, and the differentia should have a rational nexus with the object of legislation. The Union of India rightly contends that immovable property and immovable goods for the purpose of GST constitute a class by themselves,” the Court explained.
The Court found, “It is not shown how the provision is arbitrary and discriminatory. The fact that the provisions could have been drafted in a better manner or more articulately is not sufficient to attract arbitrariness.”
Consequently, the Court held, “We fail to understand the argument that the classification is underinclusive and creates discrimination. In this case, equals are not being treated as unequals. The test of vice of discrimination in taxing law is less rigorous. Ultimately, the legislature was dealing with a complex economic problem. By no stretch of the imagination, clauses (c) and (d) of Section 17(5) can be said to be discriminatory.”
The Court further observed that the expression “plant or machinery” used in Section 17(5)(d) cannot be given the same meaning as the expression “plant and machinery” defined by the explanation to Section 17.
"The question whether a mall, warehouse or any building other than a hotel or a cinema theatre can be classified as a plant within the meaning of the expression “plant or machinery” used in Section 17(5)(d) is a factual question which has to be determined keeping in mind the business of the registered person and the role that building plays in the said business. If the construction of a building was essential for carrying out the activity of supplying services, such as renting or giving on lease or other transactions in respect of the building or a part thereof, which are covered by clauses (2) and (5) of Schedule II of the CGST Act, the building could be held to be a plant. Then, it is taken out of the exception carved out by clause (d) of Section 17(5) to sub-section (1) of Section 16. Functionality test will have to be applied to decide whether a building is a plant. Therefore, by using the functionality test, in each case, on facts, in the light of what we have held earlier, it will have to be decided whether the construction of an immovable property is a “plant” for the purposes of clause (d) of Section 17(5).", it said.
Regarding the challenge against Section 16(4 the Court noted that the words “thirtieth day of November” were substituted with effect from 1st October 2022 for the words “due date of furnishing of the return under Section 39 for the month of September”.
"We fail to understand how sub-section (4) of Section 16 becomes discriminatory when the legislature says that a registered person shall not be entitled to take ITC in respect of any invoice or debit note for the supply of goods or services or both after the thirtieth day of November following the end of the financial year to which such invoice or debit note pertains or furnishing of the relevant annual return, whichever is earlier. It is not shown how the provision is arbitrary and discriminatory. The fact that the provisions could have been drafted in a better manner or more articulately is not sufficient to attract arbitrariness.", it said.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals.
Cause Title: Chief Commissioner of Central Goods and Service Tax & Ors. v. M/s Safari Retreats Private Ltd. & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 756)
Appearance:
ASG N. Venkatraman; Senior Advocates Arijit Prasad, Sujit Ghosh, Abhratosh Majumdar, Arvind P Datar, and V Raghuraman; AOR Gurmeet Singh Makker, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Meera Mathur, Suvendu Suvasis Dash, Prasenjeet Mohapatra, D.L. Chidananda, et al; Advocates Sonu Bhatnagar, Abhishek A Rastogi, Vipin Jain, Vinay Saraf, Priyanka Rathi, Ashwini Chandrasekaran, Anshika Aggarwal, Pooja M Rastogi, et al