Mere Knowledge That Victim Is SC/ST Member Not Sufficient To Attract Offence Under SC-ST (Prevention Of Atrocities) Act: SC Grants Anticipatory Bail To Shajan Skariah
|The Supreme Court while granting anticipatory bail to Shajan Skariah, Editor of an online news channel ‘Marunandan Malayali’, held that mere knowledge that the victim is a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) is not sufficient to attract offence under SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
The Court held thus in a criminal appeal filed by Shajan against the judgment of the Kerala High Court by which it dismissed his appeal and affirmed the order of the Special Judge declining anticipatory bail to him.
The two-Judge Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra observed, “At the cost of repetition, the words in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are altogether different. Mere knowledge of the fact that the victim is a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989. As discussed earlier, the offence must have been committed against the person on the ground or for the reason that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. When we are considering whether prima facie materials exist, warranting arrest of the appellant, there is nothing to indicate that the allegations/statements alleged to have been made by the appellant were for the reason that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste.”
The Bench emphasised that the term ‘humiliation’ as it appears in Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act must be construed, that is, in a way that it deprecates the infliction of humiliation against members of the SCs/STs wherein such humiliation is intricately associated with the caste identity of such members.
Senior Advocates Sidharth Luthra and Gaurav Agrawal appeared for the appellant while Senior Advocate P.V. Dinesh and Advocate Haris Beeran appeared for the respondents.
Factual Background -
In May 2023, the appellant i.e., Shajan Skariah in his capacity as the Editor of an online news channel named “Marunandan Malayali” published a video on YouTube, an online video sharing platform, levelling certain allegations against the complainant. The complainant who is a Member of the Kerala Legislative Assembly (MLA) representing the Kunnathunad constituency, a seat reserved for the members of the Scheduled Castes, aggrieved by the publication of the said video, filed a written complaint before the ACP, Central Police Station, Ernakulam alleging that the video was published by the appellant in order to publicise, abuse and insult him being SC member.
Resultantly, an FIR was registered against the appellant and two other persons for offences punishable under Section 120(o) of the Kerala Police Act (KP Act) and Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) of the SC/ST Act. The complainant had alleged that the video caused him a lot of humiliation, mental pain and agony. He also alleged that the video was uploaded by the appellant with the intention to humiliate and ridicule him among the general public with the knowledge that he is a member of the Pulaya community, which is a Scheduled Caste. Apprehending his arrest, the appellant approached the Special Judge but he was denied anticipatory bail. Thereafter, he went before the High Court but it affirmed the impugned order. Hence, he filed an appeal before the Apex Court.
The following issues arose for consideration before the Supreme Court –
a. Whether Section 18 of the Act, 1989 imposes an absolute bar on the grant of anticipatory bail in cases registered under the said Act?
b. When can it be said that a prima facie case is made out in a given FIR/complaint?
c. Whether the averments in the FIR/complaint in question disclose commission of any offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989?
d. Whether any offence under Section 3(1)(u) of the Act, 1989 could be said to have been prima facie made out in the FIR/complaint in question?
e. Whether mere knowledge of the caste identity of the complainant is sufficient to attract the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989?
The Court after hearing the contentions of the counsel noted, “The duty to determine prima facie existence of the case is cast upon the courts with a view to ensure that no unnecessary humiliation is caused to the accused. The courts should not shy away from conducting a preliminary inquiry to determine if the narration of facts in the complaint/FIR in fact discloses the essential ingredients required to constitute an offence under the Act, 1989. It is expected of the courts to apply their judicial mind to determine whether the allegations levelled in the complaint, on a plain reading, satisfy the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. Such application of judicial mind should be independent and without being influenced by the provisions figuring in the complaint/FIR.”
The Court said that all insults or intimidations to a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe will not amount to an offence under the Act, 1989 unless such insult or intimidation is on the ground that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.
“There is nothing in the transcript of the uploaded video to indicate even prime facie that those allegations were made by the appellant only on account of the fact that the complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste. From the nature of the allegations made by the appellant, it appears that he is at inimical terms with the complainant. His intention may be to malign or defame him but not on the ground or for the reason that the complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste”, it added.
The Court elucidated that the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is not established merely on the fact that the complainant is a member of a SC/ST, unless there is an intention to humiliate such a member for the reason that he belongs to such community.
“In other words, it is not the purport of the Act, 1989 that every act of intentional insult or intimidation meted by a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe to a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 merely because it is committed against a person who happens to be a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. On the contrary, Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation is that the person who is subjected to it belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe”, it observed.
Furthermore, the Court remarked that not every intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST community will result into a feeling of caste-based humiliation and it is only in those cases where the intentional insult or intimidation takes place either due to the prevailing practice of untouchability or to reinforce the historically entrenched ideas like the superiority of the “upper castes” over the “lower castes/untouchables”, the notions of ‘purity’ and ‘pollution’, etc. that it could be said to be an insult or intimidation of the type envisaged by the Act, 1989.
“Having regard to the reprehensible conduct and the nature of the derogatory statements made, the appellant, at best could be said to have prima facie committed the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 of the IPC. If that be so, it is always open for the complainant to prosecute the appellant accordingly. However, the complainant could not have invoked the provisions of the Act, 1989 only on the premise that he is member of Scheduled Caste, more so, when a prima facie conjoint reading of the transcript of the video and the complaint fails to disclose that the actions of the appellant were impelled by the caste identity of the complainant”, it also emphasised.
The Court said that the appellant via YouTube video did not promote feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill-will against SC/ST members as his target was just the complainant alone. It added that the offence under Section 3(1)(u) will come into play only when any person is trying to promote ill feeling or enmity against the members of the SC/ST as a group and not as individuals.
“A penal statute must receive strict construction. A principle of statutory interpretation embodies the policy of the law, which is in turn based on public policy. The court presumes, unless the contrary intention appears, that the legislator intended to conform to this legal policy. A principle of statutory interpretation can, therefore, be described as a principle of legal policy formulated as a guide to the legislative intention”, it concluded.
Accordingly, the Apex Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and granted anticipatory bail to Shajan.
Cause Title- Shajan Skaria v. The State of Kerala & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 625)
Appearance:
Appellant: Senior Advocates Sidharth Luthra, Gaurav Agrawal, AOR Surbhi Kapoor, Advocates Abhay Anil Anturkar, Dhruv Tank, Aniruddha Awalgaonkar, Sarthak Mehrotra, Ayush Kaushik, and Bhagwant Deshpande.
Respondents: Senior Advocate P.V. Dinesh, AORs Nishe Rajen Shonker, Radha Shyam Jena, Advocates Haris Beeran, Anu K Joy, Alim Anvar, Ajith Anto Perumbully, Anna Oommen, Urvashi Chauhan, Azhar Assees, and Anand B. Menon.