An Opportunity To Register A False Case Being Furnished By Official Duty Won’t Be Sufficient To Apply Section 197 CrPC: SC
The Supreme Court observed that the mere fact that an opportunity to register a false case was furnished by the official duty would not be sufficient to apply Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC).
The Court observed thus in Criminal Appeals preferred against the Judgment of the Allahabad High Court by which it allowed the Applications and quashed the proceedings arising out of a case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 201, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
The two-Judge Bench of Justice Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra held, “… when a police official is said to have lodged a false case, he cannot claim that sanction for prosecution under Section 197 CrPC was required since it can be no part of the official duty of a public official to lodge a bogus case and fabricate evidence or documents in connection with the same. On examining the quality of the act, it is evident that there exists no reasonable or rational nexus between such an act and the duties assigned to the public servant for the claim that it was done or purported to be done in the discharge of his official duty. The mere fact that an opportunity to register a false case was furnished by the official duty would certainly not be sufficient to apply Section 197 CrPC.”
The Bench reiterated that any misuse or abuse of powers by a public servant to do something that is impermissible in law like threatening to provide a tutored statement or trying to obtain signatures on a blank sheet of paper; causing the illegal detention of an accused; engaging in a criminal conspiracy to create false or fabricated documents; conducting a search with the sole object of harassing and threatening individuals, amongst others, cannot fall under the protective umbrella of Section 197 CrPC.
Senior Advocate Ravindra Singh appeared on behalf of the Appellant while Senior Advocate R. Basant and AOR Nanita Sharma appeared on behalf of the Respondents.
Brief Facts -
In 2007, the Appellant lodged an FIR against the accused persons alleging that his brother who was a teacher, was killed and his brother’s son aged about 4.5 years was grievously injured by the said accused persons by indiscriminately firing with their handguns. The Appellant claimed that the incident was witnessed by him and several others. The mother of one of the accused, while alleging that the Appellant was trying to falsely implicate his son in the case of murder, moved an Application before the D.I.G., Firozabad, requesting that the investigation be transferred from the Dakshin Police Station to some other police station.
While the said accused had obtained a stay on his arrest from the High Court, the arrest of the other accused persons remained pending and the probe was going on. Thereafter, the investigation was transferred as requested by the accused’s mother. Other accused preferred Application before the Allahabad High Court, seeking to quash the proceedings. Resultantly, the High Court quashed the proceedings and being aggrieved, the Appellant was before the Apex Court.
The Supreme Court in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, noted, “… it is not possible to carve out one universal rule that can be uniformly applied to the multivarious facts and circumstances in the context of which the protection under Section 197 CrPC is sought for. Any attempt to lay down such a homogenous standard would create unnecessary rigidity as regards the scope of application of this provision.”
In view of the above, the Court summarised the position of law as below –
(i) The object behind the enactment of Section 197 CrPC is to protect responsible public servants against institution of possibly false or vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act in their official capacity.
(ii) The expression “any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” in Section 197 CrPC must neither be construed narrowly nor widely and the correct approach would be to strike a balance between the two extremes.
(iii) It is essential that the Court while considering the question of applicability of Section 197 CrPC truly applies its mind to the factual situation before it.
(iv) A public servant can only be said to act or purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such that it lies within the scope and range of his official duties.
(v) One of the foremost tests which was laid down in this regard was - whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does, he does in virtue of his office.
(vi) Later, the test came to be re-modulated. It was laid down that there must be a reasonable connection between the act done and the discharge of the official duty and the act must bear such relation to the duty such that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that his actions were in the course of performance of his duty.
(vii) If in performing his official duty, the public servant acts in excess of his duty, the excess by itself will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant from protection under Section 197 CrPC if it is found that there existed a reasonable connection between the act done and the performance of his official duty.
(viii) It is the “quality” of the act that must be examined and the mere fact that an opportunity to commit an offence is furnished by the official position would not be enough to attract Section 197 CrPC.
(ix) The legislature has thought fit to use two distinct expressions “acting” or “purporting to act”. The latter expression means that even if the alleged act was done under the color of office, the protection under Section 197 CrPC can be given.
(x) There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down such a rule.
(xi) The provision must not be abused by public servants to camouflage the commission of a crime under the supposed color of public office.
The Court, therefore, concluded that in cases where there is a legitimate doubt as regards whether sanction for prosecution under Section 197 CrPC is required or not, the progress of the trial must not be hampered or unnecessarily delayed.
Accordingly, the Apex disposed of the Appeals, set aside the Order of the High Court, and directed the Trial Court to proceed with the trial within one year.
Cause Title- Om Prakash Yadav v. Niranjan Kumar Upadhyay & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 979)
Appearance:
Appellant: Senior Advocate Ravindra Singh, AOR Syed Mehdi Imam, Advocates Raman Yadav, Ruchi Mandal, Akriti Chaturvedi, Priyam Kaushik, and R. S. Yadav.
Respondents: Senior Advocate R. Basan, AORs Sarvesh Singh Baghel, Ujjwal Singh, Nanita Sharma, Advocates Mayank Sapre, Vivek Sharma, Deepanshu Rana, and Harshit Shishodia.
