There Is No Provision In Stamp Act Which Excludes Applicability Of Section 5 Of Limitation Act: Bombay HC
The Bombay High Court observed that there is no provision in the Stamp Act, 1899 that excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
The Court was hearing a Writ Petition against the order of Inspector General of Registrar and Controller of Stamp who rejected Petitioner’s application for refund of stamp duty on the sole ground that it was filed beyond the period of six months mandated under Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958.
The bench of Justice K.R. Shriram and Justice Jitendra Jain observed, “there is no provision which excludes applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the Stamp Act and more particularly in Section 48 of the said Act which provides for time limit for making the application for refund of stamp duty….the present petition can be treated as an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and accepting the reason for the delay, the petition is required to be allowed by condoning the delay in making the refund application.”
Advocate Bernardo Reis appeared for the Appellant and Panel Counsel Shahaji Shinde appeared for the Respondent.
Brief Facts-
The Petitioner entered into a development agreement with Keshav Krishanlal Syngal and paid a stamp duty of Rs.78.65L. The parties decided to cancel the development agreement and therefore executed a cancellation deed. A conveyance deed was executed to transfer the property to the Petitioner for which ₹1Cr in stamp duty was paid. The Petitioner applied for a refund of stamp duty, nearly after 2 years and 8 months of cancellation. The authority rejected the application on the ground that the same was filed beyond the 6-month deadline.
The Court perused Section 48 of Stamp Act and observed, “Though it does provide an outer limit of 6 months to make the application from the date of instruments, it does not say that application made beyond the period 6 months will not be entertained. In the Stamp Act, there is no provision conferring power of condonation to the authority under the Act or any provision which states that power of condonation cannot be exercised after the extended period of limitation.”
The Court mentioned the Apex Court decision in Mool Chandra vs. Union of India & Anr. where according to the Court it was observed, “it is not the length of delay that would be required to be considered while examining the plea for condonation of delay, it is cause for delay which has been propounded will have to be examined. If the cause for delay would fall within the four corners of “sufficient cause”, irrespective of length of delay same deserves to be condoned.”
The Court said that the present petition is to be treated as an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act which provides that any application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the period specified.
The Court mentioned the Supreme Court decision in Mohd. Abaad Ali & Anr. Vs. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence, where SC observed, “unless there is an express or implied bar to the applicability of the Limitation Act in a particular Special Act, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply.”
Accordingly, the Court allowed the Writ Petition by condoning the delay in making the refund Application.
Cause Title: Nanji Dana Patel v. State of Maharashtra (Neutral Citation: 2024:BHC-AS:34812)
