Minor Can Be A Transferee Though Not A Transferor Of Immovable Property: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court emphasised that a minor can be a transferee though not a transferor of an immovable property.
The Court emphasised thus in civil appeals preferred by the legal representatives of the defendants in a civil suit against the judgment of the Chhattisgarh High Court, reversing the concurrent judgments of the Courts and consequently drawn decree.
The two-Judge Bench comprising Justice C.T. Ravikumar and Justice Sanjay Kumar observed, “Though an agreement to sell is a contract of sale, going by its definition under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, a sale cannot be said to be a contract. Sale, going by the definition thereunder, is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. The conjoint reading of all the aforesaid relevant provisions would undoubtedly go to show that they would not come in the way of transfer of an immovable property in favour of a minor or in other words, they would invariably suggest that a minor can be a transferee though not a transferor of immovable property.”
In this case, the respondent filed a civil suit against the defendants (appellants) for recovery of possession of suit schedule property based on title besides claiming damages to Rs. 10,500/- and future damages at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per acre and for costs. It was averred that he purchased the suit schedule property as per the registered sale deed from a person who was the common cousin of himself and the original defendants. Furthermore, he averred that since its registration he was enjoying peaceful possession of the property under Bhumiswami Rights till he was dispossessed by the defendants in July 1983. The defendants jointly filed a written statement contending that their father and the plaintiff’s father purchased the property in the name of their nephew and also purchased another land.
Upon the plaintiff’s father’s death, the property was transferred in the plaintiff’s name in 1968 his name was recorded in the revenue records, albeit claimed that its possession still remained with them. In 1976, an oral partition took place between the defendant’s father and plaintiff’s family. The Trial Court held that the age of the vendor who was the common cousin of the plaintiff and the original defendants, was shown in the sale deed as 22 years and hence, at the time of purchase of the property, he must have been aged only 17 years. It, therefore, held that it was a joint family property and there was no evidence to show that the said vendor was then the head of the family and hence, had no right to sell the land. The suit was resultantly dismissed and being aggrieved, the plaintiff approached the Third Additional District Judge, Raipur. However, the appeal was dismissed and the suit dismissal was confirmed. The High Court reversed the concurrent judgment and allowed the appeal. Hence, the matter was before the Apex Court.
The Supreme Court in the above context of the case, said, “In such circumstances, it can only be said that Sh. Sitaram had no legal disability or disqualification at the time of purchase of suit land on 15.03.1963 in his name as also the plaintiff, as a transferee, at the time of execution of Ext.P1/C - sale deed on 04.06.1968. It is nobody’s case that at the time of execution of Ext.P1/C Sitaram had not attained majority.”
The Court noted that, once the plaintiff proves his title over suit property, it is for the defendant resisting the same claiming adverse possession that he perfected title through adverse possession and in that regard, in terms of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the starting point of limitation would not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but would commence only from the date the defendant’s becomes adverse.
“In the decision in Brij Narayan Shukla (D) through LRs. v. Sudesh Kumar alias Suresh Kumar (D) through LRs. and Ors.14, this Court while considering the question whether tenants of original owner could claim adverse possession against transferee of land lord held that tenants or lessees could not claim adverse possession against their landlord/lessor, as the nature of their possession is permissive in nature”, it added.
Furthermore, the Court observed that the evidence on the part of the defendants/appellants would reveal that instead of establishing ‘animus possidendi’ under hostile colour of title, they have tendered evidence indicating only permissive possession and at the same time failed to establish the time from which it was converted to adverse to the title of the plaintiff which is open and continuous for the prescriptive period.
“Upon considering the evidence on the part of the appellants herein (the defendants), we have no hesitation to hold that the requirements to co-exist to constitute adverse possession are not established by them. So also, it can only be held that the reckoning of the period of limitation from the date of commencement of the right of ownership of the plaintiff over the suit land instead of looking into whether they had succeeded in pleading and establishing the date of commencement of adverse possession and satisfaction regarding the prescriptive period in that regard, was rightly interfered with, by the High Court”, it held.
The Court also reiterated that, being concurrent cannot be a ground for confirmation and that the concurrent findings could be set aside if perversity is found with the impugned decision.
“The upshot of the discussion as above is that the well-merited decision of the High Court in the impugned judgment invite no interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction and the appeals are liable to be dismissed”, it concluded.
Accordingly, the Apex Court dismissed the appeals.
Cause Title- Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 769)
Appearance:
AORs Pratibha Jain, Divyakant Lahoti, Sumeer Sodhi, Advocates Christi Jain, Akriti Sharma, Mann Arora, and Om Sudhir Vidyarthi.
