There Can Be No Discharge Solely On Basis Of Polygraph Test At Charge Stage: Delhi HC Expresses Dismay Over Bail Granted After Test Of Victim And Accused
The Delhi High Court expressed dismay over the Trial Court’s decision of granting bail to the Accused based solely on the results of the polygraph tests which were conducted on the Accused and the Victim upon the directions of the Court.
The Court set aside the order of the Trial Court to the extent of the discharge of the Second Respondent. The Court emphasized that the Trial Court erred in its decision by holding a mini-trial at the stage of framing of the charge by relying heavily on the polygraph test to discharge the Accused under Section 376 of IPC.
Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma observed, “This Court notes with dismay that at the time of grant of anticipatory bail to the accused a suggestion was made in the order to the IO by the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the prosecutrix in this case be made to undergo polygraph test with a view to test genuineness, authenticity and truth of her statement in a case under Section 376 of IPC, when the chargesheet was not even filed”.
“Therefore, clearly the learned Trial Court has committed an error by holding a mini-trial at the stage of framing of charge itself by relying heavily on the polygraph test to discharge the accused under Section 376 of IPC and assumptions about absence of injury on private part of the victim and also possibility of interference with the CCTV footage. The abovementioned had to be necessarily decided after giving opportunity to both the sides to lead evidence”, the Court noted.
Advocate Prateek Baghel appeared for the Petitioner and Additional Public Prosecutor Naresh Kumar Chahar appeared for the Respondent.
Per the case information, a PCR call was received regarding a quarrel between the Prosecutrix and the Second Respondent (tenant at Prosecutrix’s house). The Prosecutrix had already gone to the hospital for a medical examination but the parties later settled. However, the Prosecutrix later filed a complaint alleging that while taking a stroll with her sister-in-law, the Second Respondent called her and attempted to rape her. Thereafter, the Wife of the Second Respondent hurt the Prosecutrix and her sister-in-law. The Trial Court had directed for polygraph test of both the Second Respondent and the Prosecutrix to ascertain the bail application. The Petitioner approached the Court by way of a Criminal Revision Petition challenging the order of the Trial Court and sought framing of charges for offences punishable under Sections 376, 323, 354, 354B, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
The Court ascertained the following issue:
“whether the result of a polygraph test can become ground of discharge of an accused at stage of charge and could the learned Judge while passing order on application for grant of anticipatory bail, pass an order suggesting to the IO to conduct polygraph test of accused and victim to ascertain the truth of the matter without there being a prayer by accused or prosecution”.
The Court disapproved the actions of the Learned Judge that granted interim protection and directed the Investigating Officer to polygraph test, not only of the accused but also of the victim. The Court also noted that the learned Judge was neither appreciating evidence at the stage of the Trial nor supervising the investigation in any manner but was only holding a bail roster.
“It is also settled law that as a general rule, investigation is the prerogative of the Investigating Agency and the Courts usually do not interfere in the process of investigation and do not direct as to what should be investigated and how [Refer: Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary and Ors. (2014) 2 SCC 532]”, the Court noted.
Additionally, the Court emphasized the essential difference between the two critical stages of evaluating the material on record. Initially, at the charge stage, the court examines materials such as the chargesheet, medical or digital evidence, and statements of witnesses recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The Court asserted that the goal is to form a prima facie view and determine if there's enough evidence to create strong suspicion against the accused, warranting the framing of charges.
In contrast, the Court observed that during the final decision after a comprehensive trial, the focus shifts to the testimony of witnesses and corroborative evidence. The Court assesses whether the prosecution has proven these elements on record and evaluates the evidentiary value, quality, and consistency of these testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses. Notably, the Court observed that at such a stage, the case must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If any presumption arises in favor of the accused, it is their entitlement to the benefit of that presumption, the Court noted.
Additionally, the Court observed that a criminal court has to explore innumerable factors that can and would affect the truthfulness of a particular testimony at a relevant stage of the trial and if the criminal courts start discharging the Accused based on polygraph tests, will overlook the materials collected by the Prosecution and testimonies of the witness. The Trial Court considering a polygraph test at the stage of granting anticipatory bail was against the mandate of the law, the Court held.
“A criminal Court has to explore innumerable factors which could affect the truthfulness of particular testimony of a particular witness as also the accuracy of a particular test at the relevant stage of trial. In case the criminal courts will start discharging accused on the basis of a polygraph test at the stage of charge itself, a criminal trial - instead of testing the veracity of the statement of the victim or prosecution proving its case beyond reasonable doubt - will wriggle down to appreciation of a polygraph test and not the test of the material collected by the prosecution and the statements and testimonies of the victim”, the Court noted.
Accordingly, the Court allowed the Petition and set aside the impugned order to the extent of the discharge of the Second Respondent.
Cause Title: S v State and Ors. (2023:DHC:7534)
