Subsequent Change Of Law Is Not Valid Ground For Condonation Of Delay: Apex Court
The Supreme Court has observed that a subsequent change of law is not a valid ground for the condonation of delay.
In that context, the Bench of Justice Surya Kant, Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan observed that, "if subsequent change of law is allowed as a valid ground for condonation of delay, it would open a Pandora’s Box where all the cases that were subsequently overruled, or the cases that had relied on the judgements that were subsequently overruled, would approach this Court and would seek a relief based on the new interpretation of law. There would be no finality to the proceedings and every time this Court would reach a different conclusion from its previous case, all such cases and the cases relying on it would be reopened."
The appeals were filed by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA), Government of National Capital of Delhi (GNCTD), Land Acquisition Collector (LAC), Delhi State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation (DSIIDC), East Delhi Municipal Corporation, and Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC) against several identical orders from the High Court of Delhi. These orders had declared that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act). The appellants also moved multiple Review Petitions and Miscellaneous Applications seeking to recall and review certain orders of the Supreme Court dismissing their Special Leave Petitions (SLPs), where some of the land acquisition proceedings were declared lapsed.
The GNCTD had initiated the land acquisition process under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1894 Act) for the planned development of Delhi. Various state entities like the DDA, DSIIDC, and DMRC needed the lands for projects such as residential schemes, industrial areas, flyovers, and the Delhi Metro. Between 1957 and 2006, notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act were issued, and awards under Section 11 were passed, fixing compensation. In some cases, compensation was deposited in the treasury as landowners did not come forward to receive it. Possession was not taken in some instances due to landowners obtaining stay orders against the acquisition proceedings.
With the enactment of the 2013 Act, the 1894 Act was repealed, introducing reforms to the land acquisition process. Section 24 of the 2013 Act provided that ongoing land acquisition proceedings would be deemed lapsed if compensation had not been paid or possession had not been taken. This provision led to several interpretations by the Supreme Court.
In Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harak Chand Misirimal Solanki (2014), the Supreme Court held that depositing compensation with the Reference Court fulfilled the requirement of compensation being "paid," but depositing it with the Government Treasury did not. In Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu (2015), the Court ruled that a stay order did not exclude the period from the lapse calculation, and thus, failure to take possession resulted in the proceedings lapsing. Following these rulings, landowners approached the High Court from 2014 to 2017, seeking declarations that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed due to non-payment of compensation or non-taking of possession. The High Court, relying on the Supreme Court's decisions, declared the acquisition proceedings lapsed.
The appellants' SLPs against these High Court orders were mostly dismissed. However, the correctness of these decisions was later doubted by two-judge benches in cases like Yogesh Neema v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra, leading to referrals to larger benches. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (2018), a three-judge bench held that the term "paid" included tendering payment, and "deposit" included deposits with the Government Treasury. The bench declared Pune Municipal Corporation per incuriam and overruled Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association regarding stay orders.
Following these developments, the appellants filed more appeals, Review Petitions, and Miscellaneous Applications. The Supreme Court, in State of Haryana v. GD Goenka Tourism Corporation Ltd. (2018), deferred hearings on referring the matter to a larger bench, instructing High Courts not to deal with Section 24 cases. Eventually, a five-judge bench in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal (2020) decided that for proceedings to lapse under Section 24(2), both compensation must not have been paid and possession must not have been taken. The bench overruled Pune Municipal Corporation and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association.
The appellants argued that delays in filing appeals and applications were due to sufficient causes, while respondent-landowners contended that the appellants failed to show sufficient cause for the significant delays. The appeals before the Supreme Court were thus categorized into three groups based on when they were filed relative to key judgments, with delays varying across these categories.
The Supreme Court observed that, "The appellants let the limitation period lapse, perhaps because they saw no case on merits for appeal. When the law was subsequently re-interpreted in the afore-cited two cases, the appellants approached this Court with the present appeals, petitions, and applications. Instead of showing a sufficient cause arising within the period of limitation, they are using an event after the expiry of such period to justify the delay. This does not square with our understanding of the law, and cannot be allowed."
Subsequently, the Court took the considered view that while some of the arguments put forth by the government authorities for condonation of delay, like the subsequent change of law, special leeway for government entities, or the Court allegedly frowning upon the filing of fresh SLPs; could not be accepted, however, the appellants made out a sufficient cause for condonation of delay on the ground of public interest.
Accordingly, the Court issued separate directions for the adjudication of the cases in the three groups.
Cause Title: Delhi Development Authority vs Tejpal & Ors.
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