“Private Interest Of A Few, Should Give Way To The Public Interest Of The Many”- Supreme Court In Land Acquisition Case
The Supreme Court in a land acquisition case, remarked that the private interest of a few should give way to the public interest of many.
The Court reiterated that Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be used for claiming illicit benefits simply because someone else has been allowed such an undue favour, especially when doing so would jeopardize the entire acquisition by undermining its contiguity.
The Court was deciding appeals preferred by the Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA, now HSVP) against the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court by which the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the State were annulled by quashing the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (LA Act).
The two-Judge Bench of Justice Surya Kant and Justice K.V. Viswanathan observed, “In any case, even if the constructions were to be authorized, it would not materially affect our outcome. As has been held by this Court on several occasions, exempting lands bearing constructions from acquisition is a matter of State Policy, and not of law. In case the Government finds that exempting such lands would adversely affect the larger Development Plan or any other purpose behind the acquisition, then it can still continue with the acquisition. Private interest of a few, should give way to the public interest of the many. Prior authorization of the constructions is also not the definitive saving grace that the Respondents imagine it to be.”
The Bench said that a mere plea regarding differential treatment is insufficient; the claimant must instead demonstrate that similarly placed classes had been treated dissimilarly, unjustifiably.
Senior Additional Advocate General (AAG) Lokesh Sinhal appeared on behalf of the appellant while Senior Advocates Rajive Bhalla, Bharat Bhushan Parsoon, and Sanjeev Sharma appeared on behalf of the respondents.
In this case, a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of LA Act for acquiring a land for development and utilization for residential, commercial, institutional and recreational purposes. The respondents contended that their portion of the land under acquisition ought to be exempted as they contained fruit trees and the state policy mandates the exemption of such lands from acquisition. Additionally, they claimed that a cattle-shed, greenhouse, and an attendant room were also erected on the land, for which authorization was granted by the Commissioner, Ambala in 1992 under the Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952 (Punjab Periphery Act).
The Collector accepted the objections of the respondents, however, the State Government went ahead with acquisition, asserting that the structures were unauthorized. Being aggrieved, the respondents approached the High Court and their writ petition was allowed. Discontented with the quashing of the notifications, the appellant authority was before the Apex Court.
The Supreme Court in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, noted, “The existence of constructions on the Respondents’ land, whether authorized or not, legal or not, cannot be by themselves an absolute embargo on the Government’s power of eminent domain. The challenge brought by the Respondents on the anvil of Section 5A of the 1894 Act, therefore, falls flat.”
The Court elucidated that the Collector has no power to “decide” the case and can only give “recommendations” to the Government. It further said that, it is the Government which is the ultimate arbiter for determining whether the land is to be released or not.
“It would be pertinent to understand the object that Section 5A of the 1894 Act seeks to fulfil. A plain reading of the provision indicates that it codifies the fundamental safeguard of audi altrem partem. Landowners have the opportunity to demonstrate that the acquisition is against public purpose or marred by mala fides. In the event the landowner presents a cogent case, the appropriate government may exempt such land from acquisition. By enabling landowners to put forward their perspective and elucidate their remonstrances, Section 5A envisions a modus of deliberation and consultation, which must therefore be construed to be mandatory, akin to a right”, it explained.
The Court observed that the solution to some lands being unjustifiably left out is to direct their acquisition, not encourage the exclusion of more lands and that the latter approach only furthers the discrimination and creates more aggrieved landowners.
“… instead of multiplying the illegality, the High Court ought to have exercised its writ jurisdiction to annul such illicit benefit received by the similarly placed person. … We hasten to add here that we have no intention to suggest that bureaucratic swiftness necessarily undermines the thoroughness of the process. Indeed, our administrative setup can do with more such alacrity”, it added.
Moreover, the Court noted that this is a case where the bureaucracy abdicated its duty and failed to objectively assist the Decision-Making Authority, in arriving at a just and fair conclusion in conformity with larger public interest.
“Had the senior officers flagged all the relevant issues on file, we have no reason to doubt that the Competent Authority would have never approved the proposal to release the subject land”, it added.
The Court remarked that the issue regarding the maintainability of the appeals may be conclusively determined by examining the applicability of the doctrine of merger to the peculiar set of circumstances of the case.
“… since the previous SLPs arising out of the same impugned judgement were dismissed after granting leave, arguably, the doctrine of merger would be attracted. … However, we may hasten to add that in Kunhayammed (supra), this Court held that the doctrine of merger is neither a doctrine of constitutional law nor of statutory recognition. Since it is a common law principle directed towards judicial propriety, the same should not be applied in a straitjacket manner, and the nature of facts and circumstances of that particular case should be considered”, it also said.
The Court, therefore, concluded that the judgement of the High Court is patently unjust and could adversely affect the subject acquisition, leading to significant harm to the public at large.
Accordingly, the Apex Court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned judgment, and directed the State and the HSVP authority to take possession of the subject-land in accordance with law and commence development works without any delay.
Cause Title- Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc. (Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 796)
Appearance:
Appellant: Senior AAG Lokesh Sinhal, AOR Samar Vijay Singh, Advocates Nikunj Gupta, Himanshi Sakhya, Keshav Mittal, Fateh Singh, Manish Verma, and Varun Prasad.
Respondents: Senior Advocates Rajive Bhalla, Bharat Bhushan Parsoon, Sanjeev Sharma, AOR S. S. Shroff, Advocates Sanjay Sarin, Shekhar Verma, Vikram Sharda, Sonam Priya, Ayush Singh, Aditi Singh, Shantanu Tyagi, and Neha Goel.
