Mere Possibility Of Another Equally Possible View Must Not Form The Basis For Setting Aside Trial Court Decision To Grant Interim Injunction: SC
The Supreme Court has reiterated that the mere possibility of taking another equally possible view must not form the basis for setting aside the decision arrived at by the Trial Court in the exercise of its discretion under Order 39 of the CPC.
The Court allowed the appeal filed by the Appellant reversing the Gujarat High Court’s Order that had vacated an injunction on the sale or transfer of a suit property. The Bench reinstated the Trial Court’s decision to maintain the status quo and directed the Respondents not to create any further encumbrances on the property during the pendency of the suit.
The Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan reiterated that, “while the view taken by the appellate court may be an equally possible view, the mere possibility of taking such a view must not form the basis for setting aside the decision arrived at by the trial court in exercise of its discretion under Order 39 of the CPC. The basis for substituting the view of the trial court should be malafides, capriciousness, arbitrariness or perversity in the order of the trial court.”
AOR Chirag M. Shroff represented the Appellant, while Advocate Adithya Koshi Roy appeared for the Respondents.
The property in dispute was jointly purchased in 1991 by the parties through registered sale deeds. Subsequently, a jewellery showroom was established on the property with the involvement of all parties. However, the business ceased operations in 2013.
The Appellant discovered in 2019 that one of the Respondents, using a power of attorney granted in 1995 for administrative purposes, had executed a sale deed in favour of his son, another Respondent, without their knowledge or consent. The sale was allegedly for Rs. 1.70 crore, significantly below the property’s market value of over Rs. 20 crore at the time. Aggrieved by this transaction, the Appellant filed a civil suit for declaration, cancellation of the sale deed, and permanent injunction.
The Trial Court granted an interim injunction restraining the Respondent from dealing with the property. However, the Gujarat High Court vacated this order, citing alleged harassment by the Appellant and their use of political influence.
The Appellant submitted that the injunction granted by the Trial Court was a well-reasoned Order and the Appellate Court should remain slow in substituting its own discretion with the one exercised by the Court of first instance unless the exercise of discretion by the First Court was shown to be malicious, capricious, perverse or having been exercised in ignorance of the settled principles of law regulating the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions.
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order vacating the Trial Court Order granting injunction after reiterating that, “if the appellate court itself decides the matters required to be decided by the trial court, there would be no necessity to have the hierarchy of courts.”
“The appellate court in an appeal from an interlocutory order granting or declining to grant interim injunction is only required to adjudicate the validity of such order applying the well settled principles governing the scope of jurisdiction of appellate court under Order 43 of the CPC which have been reiterated in various other decisions of this Court. The appellate court should not assume unlimited jurisdiction,” the Court held.
The Court referred to its decision in Mohd. Mehtab Khan v. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan (2013), wherein it was observed, “In a situation where the learned trial court on a consideration of the respective cases of the parties and the documents laid before it was of the view that the entitlement of the plaintiffs to an order of interim mandatory injunction was in serious doubt, the Appellate Court could not have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the learned Trial Judge unless such exercise was found to be palpably incorrect or untenable.”
The Bench stated that Appellate Courts should not interfere with discretionary orders of Trial Courts unless they are found to be perverse, arbitrary, or contrary to settled principles of law.
Consequently, the Court held, “In view of the aforesaid, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside…The respondents herein shall maintain status quo as regards the suit property as on date and shall not create any further encumbrances over the same in any manner.”
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the Appeal.
Cause Title: Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 913)
Appearance:
Appellant: AOR Chirag M. Shroff; Advocate Mahima C Shroff,
Respondents: Advocate Adithya Koshi Roy; AOR Nikhil Goel
