Right To Vindicate & Protect Private Property Cannot Be Brushed Away Merely On Grounds Of Delay & Laches: Apex Court
The Supreme Court held that the right to vindicate and protect private property cannot be brushed away merely on the ground of delay and laches.
The Court held thus in a batch of Civil Appeals filed against the Judgment of Rajasthan High Court by which it allowed the Writ Appeals and quashed the land acquisition proceedings initiated by a Trust.
The two-Judge Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra elucidated, “The decisions of this Court have consistently held that the right to property is enshrined in the Constitution and requires that procedural safeguards be followed to ensure fairness and non-arbitrariness in decision-making especially in cases of acquisition by the State. Therefore, the delay in approaching the court, while a significant factor, cannot override the necessity to address illegalities and protect right to property enshrined in Article 300A. The court must balance the need for finality in legal proceedings with the need to rectify injustice. The right of an individual to vindicate and protect private property cannot be brushed away merely on the grounds of delay and laches.”
The Bench observed that the provisions of the Section 52(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 (RUI Act) are akin to Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (LA Act) and to initiate the acquisition proceedings, the State must publish a notice under Section 52(2) of the RUI Act for the owners or any other interested parties to show cause as to why their land should not be acquired.
Senior Advocate Archana Pathak Dave appeared for the Appellant while AOR Namita Choudhary appeared for the Respondents.
Facts of the Case -
The Urban Development Department, Rajasthan Government issued a notice under Section 52(2) of the RUI Act to one Ram Narain, proposing to acquire a land. These parcels of land were owned and possessed by the sons and daughters of Narain. The Appellant and the State Government sought to acquire the land owned and possessed by Narain and others. Ram Narain was the khatedar of the Nangli Kota and Moongaskar parcels of land. He passed away in 1973 and the Nangli Kota land was inherited by his seven sons and two daughters. As regards the Moongaska land, the same was purchased in 1966 by four individuals jointly by way of different Sale Deeds. Ram Narain’s portion of the Moongaska land was inherited by his seven sons and two daughters after his demise.
However, the names of the two daughters were not included in the list of legal heirs submitted by the seven sons and did not become a part of the mutation records until much later in 1985. The acquisition proceedings got initiated in 1976. The Appellant Trust made a Reference before the Senior Civil Judge and a notice was issued by the Reference Court to the Respondents to collect the amount towards compensation. The Single Judge of the High Court rejected the Writ Petition holding that in view of Section 60A(4) introduced by the Amending Act, 1987, any land having stood vested in the State government prior to the August 1, 1987, the acquisition of the same cannot be challenged on the ground that no amount of compensation was deposited and paid to the landowners in accordance with Section 3A and Section 17A of the LA Act. Thereafter, the Division Bench allowed the Appeal filed by the Respondents and being aggrieved, the Appellant approached the Apex Court.
The Supreme Court in view of the above facts, noted, “… the participation in the proceedings by the landowners themselves is sufficient evidence that the object of the publication of the notice under Section 52(2) was met and we are of the view that the acquiring authority that is, the State was not required to prove actual notice of the proposal to acquire in this case and the knowledge of the appellants about the acquisition proceedings is equivalent to implied notice to the appellants.”
The Court said that the non-service of individual notices upon the owners under Section 52(2) cannot be a ground to invalidate the acquisition proceedings and hence, the reasoning of the High Court to this extent is liable to be set aside.
“As regards the delay in payment of compensation, it is apposite to state that the parallel litigation regarding the nature and ownership of land bearing Survey no. 229 concluded after the said land was mutated in the name of the respondents on 20.03.1985 after the Board of Revenue, Ajmer held on 30.12.1983 that the said land was ‘abadi land’ and belonged to the respondents and not the State Government. The appellant Trust has filed a writ petition against the mutation of the lands in the name of the respondents as the land was already previously mutated in its name in 1981. However, it is pertinent to mention that the appellant Trust did not challenge the Board of Revenue’s decision on the nature of the land”, it added.
The Court further enunciated that as per Section 52(7), the possession of the land being acquired cannot be handed over to the Appellant Trust till it deposits the compensation amount determined under Section 53 of the RUI Act.
“However, in the present case, the possession of the Nangli Kota lands was handed over to the appellant Trust long before it deposited the compensation amount with the reference court. … Even though the parallel litigation on the questions of nature and ownership of the land bearing Survey no. 229 was concluded in 1985, the compensation amount was deposited by the appellant Trust in the reference court only on 31.12.1997 that is after 12 years”, it also noted.
The Court said that contention of the Appellant Trust regarding the delay in the payment of compensation due to parallel proceedings before the revenue authorities, cannot be accepted.
“… in our considered view, the notification under Section 52(1) is liable to be declared invalid on the ground that the compensation was not deposited and paid to the respondents within the timeline specified in Section 60A(4) as well as on the ground that the acquisition process was not fair and in accordance with law. The improper procedure being adopted by the State Government and the appellant Trust when it took possession of the Nangli Kota lands before depositing compensation for the same was in contravention of the mandate of Section 52(7) of the RUI Act”, it concluded.
Accordingly, the Apex Court dismissed the Appeals and upheld the impugned Order.
Cause Title- Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi and Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 980)
Appearance:
Appellant: Senior Advocate Archana Pathak Dave, AORs R. Gopalakrishnan, Ankita Chaudhary, Advocates Raghav Sharma, Parmod Kumar Vishnoi, Avnish Dave, Kumar Prashant, Shreyas Balaji, and Vaibhav Dwivedi.
Respondents: AORs Namita Choudhary, S. K. Verma, Milind Kumar, AAG Shiv Mangal Sharma, Advocates Manish Chaubey, Kaushal Mehta, Manish Kumar Choudhary, Ashutosh Kumar, Srishti Choudhary, and Shefali Choudhary.
